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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 




ELIZABETH WERNER; JEFFREY R. ACKERMAN; 
MATTHEW W. WEISS, a minor, by his parent, Elizabeth 
Werner; TIMOTHY F. BURKE, JR., in his capacities as 
executor of the Estate of Anne L. Werner and as trustee 
of trusts created under the last will and testament of 
Anne L. Werner, deceased; JEFFREY R. ACKERMAN, in 
his capacity as trustee under Agreement of Trust for the 
benefit of Elizabeth Werner, dated December 18, 1967; 
EDWARD A. POLLACK, all of the aforementioned plaintiffs 
individually and derivatively on behalf of WERNER 
HOLDING CO. (PA), INC., and, individually but not 
derivatively; ESTATE OF LEO L. WERNER, deceased, and 
trusts created under the last will and testament of Leo L. 
Werner by and through their individual beneficiaries, 






ERIC J. WERNER; RICHARD L. WERNER; ROBERT I. 
WERNER; DONALD M. WERNER; HOWARD L. SOLOT; 
CRAIG R. WERNER; MARC L. WERNER; MICHAEL J. 
SOLOT; BRUCE D. WERNER; MICHAEL E. WERNER; 
BARBARA SCHWARTZ; MARSHA KARP; SHIRLEY W. 
RAUCH; GAIL RAUCH BLACKMAN; GAIL RAUCH 
BLACKMAN, as custodian for Heather Blackman; 
HEATHER BLACKMAN; MARLENE T. KRANE; MARLENE 
T. KRANE, as custodian for Jason S. Krane; JASON S. 
KRANE; DEBRA A. ROTHMAN; DEBRA A. ROTHMAN, as 
custodian for Kevin Matthew Rothman, for Joshua Jay 
Rothman and for Jordana Rothman; KEVIN MATTHEW 
ROTHMAN; JOSHUA JAY ROTHMAN; JORDANA 





custodian for Hannah Berk-Rauch and for Eli Berk- 
Rauch; HANNAH BERK-RAUCH; ELI BERK-RAUCH; 
MINDY ALTER; MINDY ALTER, as custodian for Razie 
Devora Alter; RAZIE DEVORA ALTER; ELISE W. FROST; 
ELISE W. FROST, as custodian for Marc William Frost, 
for Joshua Herbert Frost and for Rachel Anne Frost; 
MARC WILLIAM FROST; JOSHUA HERBERT FROST; 
RACHEL ANNE FROST; RONALD E. WERNER; MARC L. 
WERNER, as custodian for Ashley Elizabeth Werner and 
for Jeffrey A. Werner; ASHLEY ELIZABETH WERNER; 
JEFFREY A. WERNER; BEVERLY WERNER RYAN; 
BEVERLY WERNER RYAN, as custodian for Shannon 
Rose Ryan and for Erin Joy Ryan; SHANNON ROSE 
RYAN; ERIN JOY RYAN; RONI S. ROSATI; RONI S. 
ROSATI, as custodian for Ryan G. Rosati and for 
Richmond J. Rosati; RYAN G. ROSATI; RICHMOND J. 
ROSATI; CRAIG R. WERNER, as custodian for Kurt J. 
Werner and for Kyle Werner; KURT J. WERNER; KYLE 
WERNER, BRUCE D. WERNER, HOWARD L. SOLOT and 
ERIC J. WERNER, in their capacity as Trustees for 
Werner Family Trust; WERNER HOLDING CO. (PA), INC., 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
The primary issue in this appeal raises important 
questions pertaining to the failure to disclose material 
corporate information as required by federal securities law 
in a corporation's repurchase of its capital stock. The 
Werner Company ("the Company"), founded by three 
brothers, was the largest manufacturer and marketer of 
ladders and other climbing products in the United States. 
The plaintiffs are the Anne Werner Estate, the Elizabeth 
Werner Trust, and other members of the Werner family and 
their representatives who, at all relevant times, were 
minority shareholders of the Company. The ten individual 
defendants ("the Management Defendants") are also 
members of the Werner family and were officers of the 
Werner Company at all times relevant to this action. 1 
 
In 1996, the Company redeemed shares held by two of 
the plaintiffs, the Anne Werner Estate and the Elizabeth 
Werner Trust, by purchase. The plaintiffs claim that, at the 
time of those redemptions, the Management Defendants 
fraudulently concealed from them material information 
which caused them to sell their shares at a price much 
lower than they would have accepted had they been fully 
informed. 
 
The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania, alleging violations 
of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 
Rule 10b-5,3 promulgated thereunder, and numerous state 
laws. The District Court dismissed the twenty count 
complaint, as amended, in its entirety for failure to state a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Management Defendants have been, at all times relevant to this 
action, shareholders and officers of the Company. They are Richard L. 
Werner, Robert I. Werner, Donald M. Werner, Howard L. Solot, Craig R. 
Werner, Eric J. Werner, Marc L. Werner, Michael E. Werner, Michael J. 
Solot, and Bruce D. Werner. 
 
2. 15 U.S.C. S 78j(b). 
 
3. 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5. 
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claim on which relief could be granted. It also dismissed the 
pendent state law claims for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. The plaintiffs timely appealed only on Counts 




To understand the issues on appeal, some background 
information on the Werner Company is necessary. In 1945 
three brothers, R.D. Werner, Leo Werner, and Herbert 
Werner went into the ladder business and gave their 
company the family name. Over the years, the Company 
became extremely successful. Until November of 1997, 
when most of the Company was sold to a group of outside 
investors, all of the Company's stock was owned by 
members of the Werner family. 
 
A. The Restricted Stock Plan 
 
In 1992, the Company adopted a "Restricted Stock Plan." 
The proclaimed purpose of the plan was to give senior 
management officials an incentive to stay with the 
Company. It allowed the Board of Directors to award 
Restricted Class B Shares to certain individuals who were 
identified in the disclosure documents as "key employees" 
and "key executives." The disclosure documents did not 
reveal that only the ten management defendants would 
benefit from the Plan. 
 
Under the Restricted Stock Plan, the recipients of the 
shares were not permitted to sell them until the earliest of: 
1) seven years from the date of the award; 2) attainment of 
age 65; 3) death; or 4) permanent disability. The plan also 
provided the Company with a right of first refusal to 
acquire any awarded shares an employee wished to sell. 
Pursuant to that right, the Company could acquire the 
shares an employee wished to sell for an amount equal to 
the fair market value of the shares at the time of the sale 
minus the fair market value of the shares on the date of 
their award. The Plan was first disclosed to the 
shareholders in the 1991 Annual Report. A letter 
accompanying that report also alerted the shareholders to 
the existence of the plan, explaining its purpose and stating 
that it was "more restrictive and less generous" than "many 
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such plans." As of that time, no shares had yet been issued 
under the Plan. 
 
In Count One of their amended complaint, the plaintiffs 
assert that the existence and details of the Restricted Stock 
Plan were not adequately disclosed to them. The District 
Court dismissed this claim, holding that the 1991 annual 
report and the letter accompanying it, as well as the annual 
reports for 1992-1994, provided adequate disclosure of the 
plan. 
 
B. The Redemptions and the Sale of the Company in 
       1997 
 
In 1996 the Anne Werner Estate and the Elizabeth 
Werner Trust each sought to have the Company redeem 
some of its shares. Plaintiff Timothy Burke, in his capacity 
as executor of the Anne Werner Estate, communicated with 
the Company about the possibility of redeeming some of the 
estate's stock. By a letter written by Eric Werner on 
December 27, 1996 ("the Redemption Letter"), the Company 
agreed to repurchase the stock at approximately $1000 per 
share, a price determined by Management Planning Inc. 
("MPI"), an independent valuation firm, in its most recent 
appraisal of the Company's stock ("the MPI appraisal"). The 
MPI appraisal discounted the value of the plaintiffs' 
minority interests in the Company based on the 
assumption that the Company would continue to remain in 
the Werner family. The Redemption Letter disclosed that 
the Company "was continuing to investigate the possibility 
that it . . . or someone else may offer to purchase shares 
from one or more shareholders . . . in the future at prices 
which cannot be determined at this time, but which may be 
less than or in excess of any price you may offer or accept." 
 
On December 30, 1996, the Anne Werner Estate sold its 
shares under the conditions set forth in the Redemption 
Letter. The Elizabeth Werner Trust sold its shares in 
January 1997 under the same conditions. 
 
On October 8, 1997, the Company signed a 
Recapitalization Agreement with a group of outside 
investors known collectively as Investcorp. This agreement, 
which was approved by 96% of the Werner Company 
shareholders, amounted to a sale of most of the Company. 
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Under the Agreement, the Company agreed to: 1) redeem 
approximately 86% of the outstanding stock held by non- 
management shareholders and 81% of the stock held by 
management shareholders; 2) reclassify its remaining 
outstanding stock; and 3) issue additional stock to 
Investcorp in return for $123 million. In the redemptions 
following the Recapitalization Agreement, each shareholder 
received nearly $2500 per share redeemed. 
 
Count One of the plaintiffs' amended complaint alleges 
that, at the time of the acquisitions from the Anne Werner 
Estate and the Elizabeth Werner Trust, the Management 
Defendants were seriously considering a sale of the 
Company and fraudulently concealed that information from 
the plaintiffs. They claim that this omission caused them to 
sell their shares at a price much lower than what they 
would have accepted had they been informed of the 
contemplated sale. 
 
The District Court held that these allegations, as stated 
in the amended complaint, failed to state a claim on which 
relief could be granted. The crux of its holding was that the 
plaintiffs failed to allege that the decision to pursue a sale 
of the company had been made by December of 1996. 
Rather, the complaint alleges that, in 1996, the Board of 
Directors had begun to consider various "strategic 
alternatives," which included: 
 
       an initial public offering or a private placement of 
       shares of Werner Co.'s capital stock, the incurrence of 
       additional debt, the establishment of an employee 
       stock ownership plan, a leveraged recapitalization or 
       share repurchase, joint ventures with strategic or 
       financial partners to partially divest various operations 
       and the sale of Werner Co. or parts thereof. 
 
(Compl. at P 133). The District Court held that the initial 
consideration of these strategic alternatives was immaterial 
as a matter of law. It stated 
 
       No case . . . has, to the court's knowledge, found a 
       potential sale material to a securities transaction 
       where, as here, the company: (1) was considering 
       offering itself for sale; (2) was considering other 
       alternatives to a sale; (3) had not identified a specific 
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       buyer; (4) had not retained a financial advisor for the 
       purposes of exploring a sale; and (5) had not conducted 
       any discussions, preliminary or otherwise, with a 
       potential buyer or buyers. 
 
(Op. at 11). Because it believed the allegations in the 
complaint to be insufficient to support a finding that the 
alleged misrepresentations and omissions were material to 
the plaintiffs' decisions to sell their shares, the District 
Court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim on 
which relief could be granted. 
 
C. The Proxy Statement 
 
In October of 1997, the Werner Company sent a proxy 
statement to each shareholder explaining the details of the 
proposed recapitalization. The statement clearly informed 
shareholders that management was going to amend the 
Restricted Stock Plan prior to the Recapitalization to delete 
the right of first refusal contained therein. It did not 
quantify the benefit that the deletion of the right of first 
refusal would confer upon the management defendants. 
The plaintiffs asserted that this omission constituted a 
violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 and Rule 10b-5. The District Court dismissed this 





We begin with the portion of Count One dealing with the 
redemptions by the Company of the shares held by the 
Anne Werner Estate and the Elizabeth Werner Trust. The 
plaintiffs allege that the Management Defendants violated 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by failing to inform them, 
prior to the redemptions, that the Company was 
considering offering itself for sale. Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act makes it illegal to 
 
       use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale 
       of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive 
       device or contrivance in contravention of such rules 
       and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as 
       necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors. 
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15 U.S.C. S 78j(b). Rule 10b-5, promulgated under Section 
10(b), makes it unlawful to: 
 
       make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit 
       to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
       statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
       under which they were made, not misleading . . . in 
       connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
 
17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5(b). 
 
The District Court dismissed Count I in its entirety, 
holding that the plaintiffs' amended complaint failed to 
allege a material misrepresentation. On appeal, in their 
reply brief, appellants have alleged the recent discovery of 
evidence consisting of Werner Company meeting minutes 
found in a related action in the New York Supreme Court 
captioned Pollack v. Bonte (New York Supreme Court Index 
No. 98/13606). Appellants assert that the minutes reveal a 
plan by the Board of Directors of the Werner Company as 
early as February 1996 to sell the corporation. Appellants 
also assert that the minutes show that the Company 
retained Goldman Sachs to advise the Board as to the 
feasibility of pursuing various financing transactions, and 
that Goldman Sachs greatly assisted the Board of Directors 
in deciding that a sale transaction was in the best interests 
of the Company. Appellants allege that those corporate 
minutes provide sufficient evidence of material 
misrepresentation to survive the motion to dismiss. 
Appellants ask this court to judicially notice the contents of 
the newly discovered evidence and to vacate the District 
Court's dismissal. In the alternative, they move in their 
reply brief for leave to amend their complaint to enable 
them to present the newly discovered evidence before the 
District Court. 
 
The appellees correctly assert that, in most cases, a 
"court of appeals may not consider material or purported 
evidence which was not brought upon the record in the trial 
court." United States ex rel Bradshaw v. Aldredge, 432 F.2d 
1248, 1259 (3d Cir. 1970). However, appeals courts may 
take judicial notice of filings or developments in related 
proceedings which take place after the judgment appealed 
from. See Federal Deposit Insurance Co. v. Richard A. Rubin 
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& Co., 12 F.3d 1270, 1284 (3d Cir. 1993); Landy v. Federal 
Deposit Insurance Co., 486 F.2d 139, 150 (3d Cir. 1973). 
 
A court may take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact if 
that fact is not subject to reasonable dispute. See Fed. R. 
Evid. 201(b).4 A judicially noticed fact must either be 
generally known within the jurisdiction of the trial court, or 
be capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 
See id.; see also In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 214 
F.3d 395, 398 (3d Cir. 2000); Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., 
937 F.2d 767, 774 (2nd cir. 1991); 1 Weinstein's Fed. Evid. 
S 201.12[1](2nd ed. 2001)("While judicial notice based on 
general knowledge reflects the traditional approach . . . 
notice of verifiable facts is a more modern development . . . 
consistent with the approach of the Uniform Rules of 
Evidence.) 
 
We will not judicially notice the truth of the contents of 
the meeting minutes. The minutes were filed in a separate 
action involving separate parties, in a different court, in a 
different state. Taking judicial notice of the truth of the 
contents of a filing from a related action could reach, and 
perhaps breach, the boundaries of proper judicial notice. 
See United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir 
1994)(stating that the effect of judicially noticing a fact is to 
preclude the opposing party from introducing contrary 
evidence and essentially direct a verdict against him as to 
the noticed fact). See also, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Rotches Pork Packers Inc., 969 F.2d 1384, 1388 (2d Cir. 
1992). We will neither notice nor consider the substance of 
the Board minutes in adjudicating this appeal. 
 
Judicially noticing the existence and the filing of the 
corporate minutes is a different matter. Appellants' counsel 
represent to us that subsequent to filing their opening brief, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) states: 
 
       A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable 
       dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the 
territorial 
       jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and 
ready 
       determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 
       reasonably be questioned. 
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they "discovered two documents produced by the Werner 
Company in a related action" pending in the New York 
Supreme Court between Pollack, an appellant herein, and 
the Bontes, other Company minority shareholders. They 
assert that the documents consist of June 13, 1997 Werner 
Company Board meeting minutes referring to the Board's 
February 27, 1996, decision "to consummate a sale 
transaction" and a Goldman Sachs 1996 list of Potential 
Financial Buyers for the Werner Company. Appellants 
allege that they have been denied access to these 
documents in this action and also in related state actions. 
They further assert that the June 1997 Board minutes will 
confirm that since 1996, Goldman Sachs had performed 
various valuations of the Werner Company's stock, which 
will conclusively prove that the Appellees "intentionally 
misrepresented the value of the Appellants' shares at the 
time of Appellants' stock redemption." 
 
The determination of whether the Werner Company 
produced the meeting minutes during discovery in the New 
York action is capable of accurate and ready determination 
by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned by the Werner Company itself, or by any of the 
management defendants. In short, the Board meeting 
minutes exist, certainly were produced by the Company in 
the New York Supreme Court, and amply justify the late 
effort by appellants to amend their complaint. We can and 
will judicially notice the existence and filing of these 
minutes under Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).5 
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) states that: 
 
       A party may amend the party's pleading once as a 
       matter of course at any time before a responsive 
       pleading is served . . . . Otherwise a party may amend 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The appellants attached a number of non-record documents to their 
appellate briefs, causing the appellees to move to dismiss the appeal or, 
in the alternative, to strike the appended material. Although there is 
some authority that allows a court to dismiss an appeal for improper 
augmentation of the record, see O'Keefe v. Sprout-Bauer, Inc., 970 F.2d 
1244, 1259 (3d Cir. 1992), we decline to impose such an extreme 
sanction in this case because we confine the documents to the motion 
to amend. 
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       the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written 
       consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely 
       given when justice so requires. 
 
(emphasis added). Rule 15 provides a flexible "basic policy 
statement" allowing courts freely to allow parties to amend 
their pleadings. 6 Wright, Miller, & Kane, Federal Practice & 
Procedure S 1474 (2d ed. 1990). Courts of appeals may 
grant a party leave to amend its compliant. See, e.g., Dunn 
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 589 F.2d 408, 412 (9th Cir. 
1978) (concerning amendment to allow pleadings to 
conform to evidence adduced at trial under Fed. R. Civ. 
Proc. 15(b)); 3 Moore's Federal Practice, P 15.14[4] (1999) 
("After final judgment and on appeal, amendments may be 
possible, but the pleader's burden increases. Subsequent 
leave to amend will be granted "sparingly and only if justice 
requires."). In the alternative, a court of appeals may 
remand an action with instructions to allow a party to 
amend a pleading. See, e.g., Moore v. Agency for Intern. 
Dev., 994 F.2d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 
In Moore, the Court remanded a pro se plaintiff 's action 
back to the District Court with instructions to allow the 
plaintiff to plead facts sufficient to meet the heightened 
pleading standard for Bivens actions. See Moore, 994 F.2d 
at 877. In Pross v. Katz, 784 F.2d 455, 459-60 (2d Cir. 
1986), the Court remanded an action so that the plaintiff 
could amend his complaint to satisfy the heightened 
pleading requirement for fraud. The Court's decision to 
remand was based in large part on new information 
provided to the Court for the first time at oral argument of 
the appeal. 
 
The liberal standard announced in Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 
15(a) becomes less flexible after a final judgment is entered. 
See Harris v. City of Auburn, 27 F.3d 1284, 1287 (7th Cir. 
1994) ("[A]fter judgment has been entered . .. the party 
making a [motion to amend a pleading] . . . had better 
provide the [court] with a good reason to grant his 
motion."); First Nat. Bank v. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank, 
933 F.2d 466, 468 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he presumption in 
favor of liberality in granting motions to amend . .. is 
reversed after judgment has been entered."); The Dartmouth 
Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 22 (1st Cir. 
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1989) ("[A]s the case passes through various litigatory 
stages, the pleader's burden [to obtain leave to amend] 
grows progressively heavier. . . . [A]mendments will 
sometimes be allowed, but such instances comprise the 
long-odds exception, not the rule."). However, in The 
Dartmouth Review, the Court implied that the surfacing of 
"some new concept" making "workable an action previously 
in the doldrums" was a ground for granting leave to amend 
during the pendency of an appeal. See The Dartmouth 
Review, 889 F.2d at 23 (citing Pross, 784 F.2d at 459-60). 
 
Although we are reluctant to allow amendment of a 
pleading at this stage of the proceedings, the plaintiffs were 
precluded from engaging in discovery in the District Court. 
Without discovery, plaintiffs had no way to obtain the 
meeting minutes other than by happenstance. We will not 
add to the strict discovery restrictions in the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA") by narrowly 
construing Rule 15 in this case, even at this late stage in 
the litigation. Given the high burdens the PSLRA placed on 
plaintiffs, justice and fairness require that the plaintiffs 
before us be allowed an opportunity to amend their 
complaint to include allegations relating to the newly 
discovered Board meeting minutes. Allowing the minutes 
and related evidence to be introduced in the District Court 
will not unduly prejudice the defendants; they have access 
to the minutes and they presumably know about the 
documents because they produced them in the first place. 
The Company's production supports the minutes' 
authenticity. Like all other evidentiary facts, any allegations 
in the amendment will be subject to authentication, cross- 
examination, and fact-finding in the District Court. 
 
Construing plaintiffs' alternative request in their reply 
brief as a motion for leave to amend their Amended 
Complaint to aver facts consistent with recently discovered 
evidence, we will vacate the order of the District Court 
dismissing the action as to the Count I stock redemption 
and remand the action to the District Court with directions 
to allow the plaintiff to file a second amended complaint 
based upon the existence of the aforesaid minutes. 
 





We now turn to the allegations in Count One dealing with 
the Restricted Stock Plan. Appellants assert that they were 
not adequately put on notice of the Plan's adoption because 
the information regarding the Plan was "buried" in the 
various disclosure documents. The District Court dismissed 
this claim, holding that the Company adequately described 
the Plan in the 1991 annual report and the letter 
accompanying it. We agree. 
 
Under the "buried facts" doctrine, a disclosure is deemed 
inadequate if it is presented in a way that conceals or 
obscures the information sought to be disclosed. The 
doctrine applies when the fact in question is hidden in a 
voluminous document or is disclosed in a piecemeal 
fashion which prevents a reasonable shareholder from 
realizing the "correlation and overall import of the various 
facts interspersed throughout" the document. Kas v. 
Financial General Bankshares, Inc., 796 F.2d 508, 516 
(D.C. Cir. 1986). Having reviewed the relevant documents, 
we believe that the adoption and the details of the 
Restricted Stock Plan were adequately disclosed. 
 
The adoption of the Plan was first revealed in a letter 
dated April 28, 1992, which was sent to all shareholders 
along with the 1991 annual report. The letter stated: 
 
       An appropriate program to insure the retention, long- 
       term financial reward and motivation of key executives 
       is an important element in any business but even more 
       critical in a family business. For several years this 
       concern has been expressed by many shareholders and 
       discussed by the Board of Directors. Several outside 
       consultants have addressed this matter and the 
       Directors authorized the establishment of a program in 
       March 1990. The Restricted Stock Plan is designed as 
       a "Pay for Performance" program which is keyed to 
       future increases in the value of the Company's 
       common stock values. The Plan is quite similar to 
       many such plans used by listed companies but it is 
       more restrictive and less generous. 
 
A more detailed description of the Plan was set forth in the 
1991 annual report at Note 1, entitled "subsequent events." 
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The relevant section of the report, which accompanied the 
above-quoted letter, stated: 
 
       In March 1992, a Restricted Stock Plan was 
       established whereby the Board of Directors may grant 
       awards of Restricted Class B Shares to certain key 
       employees of the Company. The Plan restricts the sale 
       of these shares by the employee until the earlier of 
       seven years of service from the date of the award, 
       attainment of age 65, death, or permanent disability. If 
       the employee terminates employment prior to the 
       completion of the seven years of service, then such 
       shares are forfeited. 
 
       The Plan provides the Company a permanent right of 
       first refusal to acquire any awarded shares an 
       employee wishes to sell. The Company would acquire 
       the shares from the employee for an amount equal to 
       the fair market value of the shares at the time of sale 
       less the fair market value of the shares at the date of 
       their award. To date no awards have been granted. 
 
In addition, each annual report from 1992 through 1994 
published details concerning the Restricted Stock Plan, 
including the number of shares issued during the relevant 
time period. This information was printed in a single 
section entitled "NOTE D -- CAPITAL STOCK AND PER 
SHARE DATA." 
 
The cases that have applied the buried facts doctrine 
have addressed situations where the manner of disclosure 
disguised or seriously distorted important information. See, 
e.g., Blanchette v. Providence & Worcester Co., 428 F.Supp. 
347, 353 (D.Del. 1977)(prospectus stated at the outset that 
acceptance of the proposed tender offer would leave 
shareholders with "similar" voting rights, but information 
on the penultimate page indicated that acceptance of the 
offer would substantially dilute those rights); National Home 
Products Inc. v. Gray, 416 F.Supp. 1293, 1215-16 (D.Del. 
1976)(information regarding litigation between company 
and its former president inadequately disclosed because it 
was "segmented into three different parts each presented in 
a different place in the documents provided shareholders"); 
Kohn v. American Metal Cimax, Inc., 322 F.Supp. 1331, 
 
                                15 
 
 
1362-63 (E.D. Pa. 1971)(200 page statement explaining 
proposed merger buried crucial information regarding the 
Directors' conflicts of interests and the investment advisors' 
lack of independence in appendices near the end of the 
document, but placed advisor's opinion that the transaction 
was fair on page 2 in bold-face type). Here, on the other 
hand, the Restricted Stock Plan was prominently addressed 
in a contiguous section of the letter accompanying the 1991 
annual report, as well as in the report itself and in 
subsequent annual reports. Accordingly, we hold that the 
buried facts doctrine does not apply. 
 
Appellants also assert, for the first time on appeal, that 
the descriptions of the Restricted Stock Plan were 
misleading because they describe the Plan's beneficiaries as 
"key executives" and "key employees" rather than disclosing 
that the Plan would only benefit the ten management 
defendants. Appellants claim that, had they known that the 
Plan was limited to the management defendants, they 
would have realized that the shares issued thereunder had 
been issued for less than fair consideration, giving rise to a 
cause of action for the wrongful dilution of their shares. 
These allegations do not state a claim under the federal 
securities laws. 
 
Claims grounded in breach of fiduciary duty or improper 
management are not actionable under Section 10(b) or Rule 
10b-5. See In re Craftmatic Securities Litigation, 890 F.2d 
628, 638-39 (3d Cir. 1990)(citations omitted). Moreover, "a 
plaintiff may not `bootstrap' a claim of breach of fiduciary 
duty into a federal securities claim by alleging that 
directors failed to disclose the breach of fiduciary duty." 
Kas, 796 F.2d at 513. Accord, Lewis v. Chrysler Corp., 949 
F.2d 644, 652 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
Appellants claim that the description of the Plan's 
beneficiaries that appeared in the disclosure documents 
was materially misleading because it failed to expose the 
management defendants' breach of state law duties."When 
the incremental value of disclosure is solely to place 
potential investors on notice that management is culpable 
of a breach of faith or incompetence, the failure to disclose 
does not violate the securities laws." Craftmatic, 890 F.2d at 
640. Accord, Lewis, 949 F.2d at 652 (management's failure 
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to disclose self-serving motive for resisting corporate 
takeover was not actionable under federal securities laws). 
Accordingly, we dismiss this claim without prejudice to 




Finally, we consider the allegations Appellants put forth 
in Count Two of their amended complaint. This Count 
concerns information that the management defendants 
allegedly omitted from the 1997 proxy statement describing 
the proposed buy-out by Investcorp. The proxy statement 
explained that, prior to the redemption of management's 
Restricted Stock, the Restricted Stock Plan would be 
amended to delete the Company's right of first refusal. The 
proxy statement failed to quantify the benefit that the 
deletion of the right of first refusal would confer upon the 
management defendants. 
 
Appellants argue that the management defendants 
violated Rule 10b-5 by failing to disclose in the proxy 
statement the amount of money that would inure to them 
as a result of the deletion of the right of first refusal. The 
District Court dismissed this claim, holding that the 
omission was immaterial as a matter of law. We affirm the 
dismissal of this Count because the shareholders had 
access to the information necessary to calculate the extent 
to which management benefitted by deleting the right of 
first refusal. 
 
The right of first refusal was described in detail in the 
1991 annual report. The report explained that, if a 
beneficiary of the Restricted Stock Plan wished to sell his or 
her shares, the Company had the right to repurchase the 
shares for an amount equal to the fair market value of the 
shares at the time of sale minus the fair market value on 
the date of their award. By deleting the right of first refusal, 
management was able to redeem their shares for their full 
value. Thus, a reasonable shareholder should have realized 
that management would get a higher price for their shares 
by deleting the right of first refusal. 
 
Moreover, the shareholders had access to all of the 
information necessary to calculate the exact amount of the 
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benefit management incurred by deleting the right of first 
refusal. A shareholder who was interested in such 
information only had to look to the 1993 and 1994 annual 
reports to determine how many shares were issued each 
year pursuant to the Restricted Stock Plan.6 Using those 
same reports, shareholders could determine the 
approximate fair market value ("FMV") of Restricted shares 
at the date of issuance.7 Shareholders could employ the 
following equation to compute the amount of money the 
management defendants would have gotten for their shares 
had the right of first refusal been exercised: 
 
       [(FMV 1997 - FMV in 1993) x number of shares issued 
       in 1993] + [(FMV 1997 - FMV 1994) x number of 
       shares issued in 1994] 
 
Interested shareholders could then compare the amount 
yielded by the above equation to the $66 million the 
management defendants would actually receive in the 
Recapitalization as proposed. 
 
The shareholders' ability to compute the extent to which 
management benefitted from deleting the right of first 
refusal demonstrates that the omission of this information 
from the proxy statement was not material. See Ash, 525 
F.2d at 219 (omission of exact difference between old and 
new pension levels in proxy was not material when proxy 
supplied shareholders with information necessary to 
perform the calculation themselves); Kahn v. Wein, 842 
F.Supp. 667, 675 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)(finding no material 
omission in letter to shareholders when attached financial 
statements contained information "from which the 
reasonable investor could perform the simple mathematical 
calculations necessary to determine the present and future 
values of the proposed transaction to both parties"); Mesh 
v. Bennett, 481 F.Supp. 904, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)(holding 
that proxy statement's failure to disclose cost of proposed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Proxy statements need not "duplicate the financial data furnished to 
shareholders in the corporation's annual reports." Ash v. LFE Corp., 525 
F.2d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 1975). 
 
7. The annual reports state how many shares were repurchased by the 
Company each year and at what cost, allowing shareholders to calculate 
the cost per share. 
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modification to employee stock incentive plan was 
immaterial because shareholders could have computed 
such an estimate from the information provided). 





In conclusion, the District Court's dismissal of Count 
Two and that portion of Count One dealing with the 
Restricted Stock Plan will be affirmed. The District Court's 
order dismissing that portion of Count One dealing with the 
redemptions will be vacated and we will remand that 
portion of the complaint to the District Court with 
instructions to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint 
in light of the June 13, 1997 Board minutes, and for such 
further proceedings as are consistent with this opinion. 
 
Costs will be taxed against the appellees. 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, Dissenting in part. 
 
I join those sections of the Majority opinion that affirm 
the District Court's dismissal of the Appellant's complaint. 
I disagree with the Majority's vacating and remanding the 
redemption claim. 
 
I. Judicial Notice1 
 
For the first time in this litigation, the Appellant's reply 
brief asserts that Werner Company corporate minutes exist, 
which, they allege, were uncovered during discovery in 
another action in New York, and, obviously, long after the 
District Court dismissed this cause on a 12 (b) (6) motion. 
I would not reverse the District Court on this basis. 
 
First, judicially noticing these corporate minutes does 
nothing to change the standards and analysis the District 
Court used in reviewing the complaint pursuant to F ED. R. 
CIV. P. 12(b)(6). All the majority has by this device is the 
allegation that some corporate minutes were transcribed 
and filed by the Werner Company after a Board of Director's 
meeting. I can well suppose that this was done numerous 
times -- indeed, probably after every Board of Director's 
meeting. This act is irrelevant to the determination of 
whether the District Court properly dismissed this claim 
based solely upon the pleadings.2 
 
Second, judicial notice is premised on the concept that 
certain facts exist that a court may accept as true without 
requiring additional proof from the opposing parties. See 
General Electric Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 
F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 1997). Put another way, judicial 
notice is an adjudicative device courts may use to 
substitute the acceptance of a universal truth for the 
conventional method of introducing evidence. Id . The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Judicial notice is one of the oldest doctrines of the common law, 
traceable to the ancient maxim, "manifesta non indigent probatione." 
("That which is known need not be proved.") 
 
2. The Majority asserts that the plaintiffs "were precluded from engaging 
in discovery in the District Court." Discovery is immaterial. This is not 
a summary judgment. It is a FED. R. C IV. P. 12 (b) (6) dismissal, and 
must be decided solely on the pleadings. 
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employment of this device, therefore, demands caution, and 
courts should strictly adhere to the criteria established by 
the Federal Rules of Evidence before taking notice of 
pertinent facts. 
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 201 empowers a court to take 
judicial notice of an adjudicative fact if that fact is "not 
subject to reasonable dispute." (emphasis added). The 
corporate minutes discovered after the case had been 
dismissed by the District Court are not "adjudicative facts." 
An adjudicative fact is one "not subject to reasonable 
dispute in that it is either (1) generally known . .. or (2) 
capable of accurate and ready determination through 
unquestionably reliable sources." See F ED. R. EVID. 201(b); 
In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litigation, 214 F.3d 395, 
398 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 
1202 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1994). In my view, these corporate 
minutes (and whatever they mean) relied on by the Majority 
do not fit within the criteria of Rule 201(b). 
 
Third, before any court takes judicial notice of a fact, we 
should permit both parties an opportunity to be heard on 
the question of whether judicial notice is proper. F ED. R. 
EVID. 201(e). Fundamental fairness requires that before 
taking judicial notice of these minutes, we should have 
given the Appellee an opportunity to challenge the propriety 
of doing so. An issue raised in a reply brief and oral 
argument do not suffice. See eg. USA v. Damato , 554 F.2d 
1371, 1373 n. 9, 10 (5th Cir. 1977). When an appellate 
court desires to augment the record by new evidence, not 
offered in the trial court, the court should afford the parties 
a hearing on whether judicial notice should be taken, an 
opportunity to examine the new evidence and comment 
thereon, and the opportunity to offer any new evidence to 
rebut the same. USA v. Doss, 564 F.2d 265, 285 n. 5 (6th 
Cir. 1977). 
 
II. New Evidence Presented in a Reply Brief 
 
Equally as troubling to me as the Majority's judicially 
noticing evidence discovered during the appellate process to 
reverse the District Court, is the fact that the issues 
emanating from these corporate minutes were raised for the 
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first time in the Appellant's reply brief. The Rules of 
Appellate Procedure contain no provision allowing for new 
issues to be presented on appeal, let alone in a reply brief. 
A reply brief is like rebuttal -- an opportunity for the 
appellant to "reply" to arguments of the appellee, not to 
raise a new issue at a time when the appellee cannot 
respond. That is unfair. The Rules of Civil Procedure, 
however, do provide a remedy specifically written for this 
eventuality. If a party discovers new evidence after 
judgment is entered, the appropriate procedure for that 
party is to request a stay from us, and move in the District 
Court for relief from its judgment under FED. R. CIV. P. 
60(b). This permits a party to present new evidence while 
maintaining the integrity of the trial and review processes 
of our respective courts, and places the initial analysis of 
that evidence, its admissibility, and its significance, within 
the jurisdiction of the District Court where it belongs. Cf. 
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17, 39, 97 S.Ct. 
31, 50 (1976) (appellate leave not required for District Court 
to rule on Rule 60(b) motion).3 Rule 60(b) is the method for 
accommodating new concerns created by new evidence. 
This process, and not an expansion of the appellate court's 
powers, should be used when new evidence is discovered 
following a judgment in a district court. 
 
Our jurisprudence is likewise clear. We stated in United 
States ex rel. Bradshaw v. Aldredge, 432 F.2d 1248, 1259 
(3rd Cir. 1970), "It is, of course, black letter law the United 
States Court of Appeals may not consider material or 
purported evidence which was not brought upon the record 
in the trial court." (Emphasis added); see also Sewak v. 
INS, 900 F2d 667, 673 (3d Cir. 1970) ("As an appellate 
court we do not take testimony, hear evidence or determine 
disputed facts. . . ."). In this Circuit, improper 
augmentation of the record "is not to be condoned, and can 
constitute an adequate basis for dismissing an entire 
appeal." O'Keefe v. Sprout-Bauer, Inc., 970 F2d 1244, 1259 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Even where the application of Rule 60(b) is barred by its one-year 
statute of limitations, it is inappropriate for an appellate court to 
remand 
the case to the district court to consider new evidence absent 
extraordinary circumstances. See Goland v. CIA , 607 F.3d 339, 370-71 
(D.C. Cir. 1978). 
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(3d Cir. 1980). As we said in Fassett v. Delta Kappa 
Epsilon, 807 F.2d. 1150, 1165 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
481 U.S. 1070, 107 S. Ct. 2463, (1987), "[T]he only proper 
function of a court of appeals is to review the decision 
below on the basis of the record that was before the District 




In summary, I dissent for three reasons. First, I believe 
the Majority's use of judicial notice is improper. Second, 
because this issue was raised for the first time in the 
Appellant's reply brief, I would not consider it. Third, the 
Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provide the appropriate 
procedural pathway, which evidently appellant's counsel 
failed to follow. I would affirm the District Court in all 
respects. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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